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Abstract
The stability of collusion is analysed for a family of demand functions whose curvature is
determined by a parameter varying between zero and infinity. If demand is sufficiently convex,
firms may prefer to act as quantity setters in order to increase cartel stability. Otherwise,
price-setting behaviour enhances their ability to collude.
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1. Introduction
The issue of cartel stability has been widely and deeply analysed under many perspectives
(see D’Aspremont and Gabszewicz (1986) for an exhaustive survey). Particularly noteworthy
efforts have been devoted to the investigation of the bearings of heterogeneity among firms on
cartel stability (D’Aspremont et al. (1983), Donsimoni (1985), Donsimoni et al. (1986)). Another
relevant stream of literature deals with the relationship between product differentiation and the
stability of collusion (see, inter alia, Deneckere (1983), Chang (1991), Ross (1992) Rothschild
(1992) and Häckner (1994)). The role of imperfect information in affecting firms’ ability to
collude has also received attention (Green and Porter (1984), Rees (1985), Rotemberg and
Saloner (1986)).
Here I want to investigate what kind of linkages there exist between the curvature, i.e.,
the convexity/concavity of the market demand function, and the stability of a cartel made up by
symmetric firms supplying a homogeneous good, under both quantity-setting and price-setting
behaviour. It turns out that under Cournot behaviour the critical discount factor is increasing
and concave in the parameter describing demand curvature, so that cartel stability is a decreasing
function of the same parameter, while under Bertrand behaviour the critical value of the discount
factor, and consequently cartel stability, are indipendent of the curvature of the demand function.
These results revise and encompass those already available in the literature (see Majerus, 1988)
as special cases.
2. The model
I adopt the simple model described by Anderson and Engers (1992, p.129), assuming, in
order to simplify calculations, that only two firms operate in the market. Theysell a homogeneous
product. The market demand function is defined by
this demand function is always downward sloping, and can be either convex (when ) or
concave (when ). Fixed costs can be assumed away without loss of generality, while it
must be assumed that marginal costs are nil in order to obtain explicit solutions. Thus, firm i’s
profit function coincides with her revenue. The collusive setting is analysed under the standard
hypothesis that after deviation agents revert to the Nash equilibrium strategies forever. The next
subsection is devoted to the analysis of Cournot behaviour. Subsection 2.2 then briefly describes
Bertrand behaviour.
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2.1. Quantity-setting duopoly
Consider first what happens if firms noncooperatively maximize single-period profits by
simultaneously choosing quantitites. Firm i’s profit is given by
The first oder condition for firm i is then
yielding
as the Nash equilibrium quantity, and
as the noncooperative equilibrium profit (see Anderson and Engers, 1992, p.131).
If instead firms collude, they cooperatively set quantities in order to maximize joint profits:
the generic first order condition is:
yielding as a solution
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while each firm’s collusive profit amounts to
A quick comparison between (4-5) and (8-9) shows that the cartel resticts both individual and
total output, consequently enhancing profits. Let’s now consider unilateral deviation from the
cartel agreement. Provided firm j sticks to her collusive output the deviation output by firm
i is obtained from condition (4):
yielding
as the single-period deviation payoff. Deviation by firm i entails the following profit for firm j:
Since, as it is easily checked, for all the punishment strategy is always
credible. Thus, for collusion to be sustainable each firm’s discount factor must sutisfy the
following condition:
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After some simple albeit tedious calculations it can be verified that and
implying that the critical discount factor is increasing and concave in The same obviously
holds for and Furthermore,
so that as α approaches either zero or infinity, the critical discount factor β is indeterminate.
Nevertheless,1
This results can be given an intuitive explanation. First, as α decreases, shrinks more
rapidly than Second, as α approaches infinity, i.e., as α increases,
catches up with faster than the latter does with
2.2. Price-setting duopoly
The case of Bertrand behaviour can be quickly dealt with. Single-period noncooperative
profit whatever the value of α, while cooperation yields half the monopoly
profit, and finally Consequently, the critical discount factor is independent
of α and each firm’s discount factor must satisfy the following condition (see Tirole, 1988,
p.246):
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1. The limit of β as α approaches zero has been computed through a binomial expansion,
which has not been included in the text due to its length.
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Numerical calculation shows that when where subscripts C and B stand for
Cournot and Bertrand behaviour, respectively. This means that a quantity-setting cartel is more
stable than a price-setting cartel for
3. Conclusions
The influence of the curvature of market demand on cartel stability has been analysed.
The results point to the conclusion that the degree of convexity/concavity of the demand function
can affect firms’ ability to collude only if they act as quantity-setters. In the Cournot framework,
the critical discount factor increases at a decreasing rate as the parameter determining the
curvature of demand increases. When firms play à la Bertrand, the nature of both competition
and equilibrium payoffs is such that the critical discount factor is indipendent of the curvature
of the demand function. Furthermore, if the latter is sufficiently convex, the critical discount
factor associated to quantity collusion is lower than that associated to price competition, so that
collusion in quantities is more stable than collusion in prices, while the opposite holds if the
demand function is only slightly convex, linear, or concave. This implies that, should firms be
able to coordinate the choice of the strategic variable in order to enhance cartel stability, they
would choose to set quantities only when facing a rather limited class of convex demand
functions. The result reached by Majerus (1988), who takes into consideration a linear demand
function and shows that when products are close or perfect substitutes price collusion is more
easily sustainable than quantity collusion, appears as a special case of the results drawn from
the model presented here.
βC = βB α~0.4753,
α ∈]0, 0.4753[.
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